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System. 1. Introduction
An unresolved puzzle in money demand studies is what drives the demand
for large denominated banknotes? While it is frequently acknowledged that
large banknotes are used for storage purposes, the motives for hoarding are
disputed. Rogoﬀ (1998) links the demand for EUR 500 notes to Europe’s
shadow economy. Porter and Judsen (1996) estimate that two-thirds of the
USD 100 notes are held outside the United States. Boeschoten and Fase
(1992) with the use of survey data show that the hoarding of large Dutch
banknotes is motivated by tax evasion. In this study, I examine an alter-
native channel that considers the hoarding preferences of immigrants. More
speciﬁcally, I ask whether European immigrants residing in Switzerland have
a higher or lower demand for large banknotes than Swiss citizens?
This study examines whether cash orders for CHF 1000 notes is concen-
trated in Swiss cities with a high foreign-to-native ratio. The Swiss case of
matching immigrant preferences to large banknotes is of particular interest.
First, immigration in Switzerland is an economic phenomenon unmatched in
the G-10 industrialized world. Immigrants constitute 22.1% of the Swiss res-
ident population in 2007 with 60.1% coming from the European Union. On
the European continent only Liechtenstein (33.9%) and Luxembourg (41.6%)
1yield higher percentages for the immigrant-to- population ratio. Second, the
CHF 1000 note possesses unique characteristics. It is the banknote with the
largest nominal value in Europe.1 The CHF 1000 note is not used in daily
transactions, yet its volume makes up 55% of total Swiss currency. This cur-
rency amount of CHF 22.4 billion for the largest denominated note means
that the average Swiss resident (Swiss population was 7.4 million in 2007)
possesses at least three CHF 1000 banknotes in 2007.
The empirical analysis uses a micro framework to investigate the impact
of the immigrant-to-native ratio on large banknotes across 250 Swiss cities
from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. A priori, the correlation’s direction is unclear. A
positive relation between cash and immigrant cities may reﬂect a low level of
ﬁnancial participation in banking services, strong links to the shadow econ-
omy, or imported habits on the part of immigrants. Alternatively, a negative
correlation may arise because of long-standing preferences of Swiss citizens to
hold large sums of cash. Here, traditional motives for precautionary money
demand linked to Switzerland’s country-speciﬁc factors of high income, low
inﬂation, low tax regime, and low crime serve as explanations.
1Historically, the CHF/EUR exchange has hoovered around 1.5, yielding 666 euros.
The EUR 500 note is the second largest banknote in nominal value.
2The empirical analysis makes three contributions, each touching the do-
mains of immigration and monetary policy. First, this country study is the
ﬁrst to estimate a currency demand speciﬁcation at the city level. Previous
studies on regional money demand used only bank deposits.2 I overcome this
deﬁcit through the use of currency orders at the bank-branch level.
A second contribution of the paper is the direct link between monetary
policy and immigration. This is of interest, especially for central banks, as
domestic aggregate demand through openness and price developments might
be closely related to the development of currency used for domestic transac-
tions. Previous studies have focused on the relationship between prices and
immigration with conﬂicting results. Micro studies by Lach (2007), Cortes
(2008), and Fratinni (2008) show that immigration’s impact on consumer
prices is not uniform across goods and countries.3 A contentious issue in
2Recent micro studies include Bover and Watson (2007), Fischer (2007), Fujiki (2002).
See also the earlier studeis by Fujiki and Mulligan (1996), Mulligan (1997), and Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin (1992). In a related study to this one, Jankowski et al. (2007) match
currency orders with Hispanic immigrant concentration for the Chicago area using census
data from 2000. It is unclear whether the cross-section estimates are valid at the state
level or nationwide.
3See also Ottiviano and Peri (2005, 2006) and Saiz (2007) for evidence of an immigration
eﬀect on house prices.
3these studies is the separation between demand and supply eﬀects. This
identiﬁcation issue in the case of currency orders is simpliﬁed, because it is
strictly demand oriented.
A third contribution is methodology. An indirect method is presented to
capture currency held for hoarding purposes, separating it from other motives
of holding cash. Rather than using an identiﬁcation strategy to determine
the amount of banknotes held beyond the domestic borders, the foreign-
to-native ratio is used in this study to determine the currency demand of
immigrants residing within the domestic borders. This new identiﬁcation
strategy internalizes the debate on the foreign demand for banknotes.4
The empirical results show that the impact of immigration on the demand
for large banknotes is heavily dependent on estimation assumptions. I show
that the hoarding of large banknotes among European immigrants living
in Switzerland is less prevalent than among natives when instrumenting for
missing variables. A 1% percent increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio
leads to a reduction by CHF 4000.
4Unlike the USD 100 note, indicative evidence (i.e., international shipments or surveys,
see Maradan 2007) suggests that the CHF 1000 note is held largely within the national
borders.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews several motives
that links immigrants to cash holdings. Section 3 presents the empirical
framework together with the data. Section 4 presents the main results with
robustness checks. Section 5 oﬀers conclusions.
2. Why Should Immigrants Hoard more than Natives?
Four channels linking hoarding to immigrants at the city level are reviewed in
this section. It is argued only the channels of precautionary money demand
and tax avoidance are germane for the Swiss case. Both channels conjecture
that immigrants should hold less large denominated banknotes.
I begin with the traditional arguments of precautionary money demand.
In the microfoundations literature developed by Whalen (1966), Miller and
Orr (1966), and Frenkel and Jovanovic (1988), the real quantity of money bal-
ances demanded for transactions and precautionary purposes is a function of
real income, the variance of real income, the rate of interest on an alternative
asset, and a set of demographic variables. Aside from income diﬀerences be-
tween regions, the fact that immigration masks important socio-demographic
traits such as age and education is another way how the immigrant-to-native
ratio enters the empirical speciﬁcation. Tin (2008), for example, using in-
5formation from the Survey of Income and Program Participation estimates
a precautionary money demand function for U.S. households that includes
family traits. Important for immigration at the city level, he ﬁnds that age
and education are positively correlated with non-interest earning checking
accounts. Similarly, Duca and Whitesell (1995) show that age is positively
correlated with the demand for credit cards.
Immigrants in Switzerland reveal contrasting traits with respect to Swiss
natives. First, immigrants are younger in age than natives. The share of
immigrant workers below the age of 40 was 56% in 2006, whereas for Swiss
workers it was 44%. Second, the average educational background of immi-
grants is lower than the Swiss. Table 1 shows the absolute numbers and their
percentages for three education categories: high school certiﬁcate, appren-
ticeship, and university degree. A striking feature of the data is the high
percentage of immigrants with only a high school degree (30%) versus the
Swiss (18%). These demographic features of immigrants should yield a nega-
tive correlation between immigrant cities and money. Since the demographic
characteristics aﬀect all money balances, a negative correlation with immi-
grant cities is expected for large as well as small denominated banknotes.
A second motive for holding large banknotes is tax avoidance, see Boeschoten
6and Fase (1992). The tax channel also has its links with immigrant cities in
Switzerland. The avoidance of Swiss wealth taxes is frequently mentioned as
a motive for holding large banknotes, see Maradan (2007). The Swiss wealth
tax is annual and is levied at the cantonal level.5 The basis of assessment
is as follows. Residents pay an annual wealth tax on the value of all assets
located in Switzerland, whereas non-residents pay an annual wealth tax on
assets derived from ﬁrms and real estate situated in Switzerland. The pro-
gressive wealth tax varies between cantons with a maximum of around 1.5%
levied on net assets. Individuals whose wealth is below a threshold of CHF
250000 (even up to CHF 500000 for certain cantons) are exempted from the
tax.
The high deductable means that the less wealthy, which especially in-
cludes immigrants, have a lower incentive to evade (or better are not aﬀected
by) the wealth tax. While there is no direct comparative information on the
wealth of immigrants and natives in Switzerland, several indicators suggest
5Several other European countries impose a wealth tax. They include France, the
Netherlands, Norway, Greece, and Liechtenstein. This tax was recently lifted in Austria
(1997), Finland (2006), Germany (1997), Iceland (2006), Luxembourg (2006), Sweden
(2007), and Spain (2008). Countries without a wealth tax include Belgium, Italy, Portugal,
and the United Kingdom.
7that the average wealth of natives is higher than that of immigrants. A ﬁrst
measure is salary and employment. Immigrants in Switzerland on average
earn less and are more likely to be unemployed than the Swiss. According
to the Swiss Bureau for Statistics (BfS) (2008), the median monthly salary
in 2006 for immigrants was CHF 5000, while for Swiss it was just under
6000. Similarly, the unemployment rate for immigrants was 7.1% in 2006,
while only 2.6% for Swiss. A second measure of wealth is home ownership.
Again according to the BfS (2008), Swiss home ownership stood at 52.7%
in 2007:Q2, whereas immigrant home ownership was just 18.6%. The higher
incentive to avoid the wealth tax on the part of wealthier natives means that
a negative correlation between immigrant cities and large denominated notes
is expected. For CHF notes with storage characteristics, this includes the
CHF 200 and CHF 1000 note.
A third motive for holding large notes on the part of immigrants as
advanced by Jankowski et al. (2007) is migrant remittances, especially to
low-income countries. Currency remittances operating through global cash
transfer services are attractive for select immigrant groups that send cash
to recipient countries with a weak ﬁnancial infrastructure. Although the
practice of cash remittances is widespread in the United States and Saudi
8Arabia, several factors speak against this argument as a viable explanation
of currency holdings among immigrants in Switzerland.
The ﬁrst counterargument is the small size of currency remittances. Ara-
povic and Brown (2009) estimate the total amount of remittances for 2006
is only CHF 0.7 billion for 404000 immigrants from the Balkans and Turkey,
i.e., the most likely users of cash transfer services. These annual transfers
yield CHF 1700 per immigrant: an amount well below the average holdings
for CHF 1000 notes per person. Further, irrespective of whether these ﬁgures
are measured correctly, immigrants from the Balkans and Turkey comprise
only 25% of the immigrant population living in Switzerland. It is thus un-
likely that these immigrant groups at the city level can inﬂuence the demand
for large banknotes in the aggregate.
Lack of ﬁnancial participation is another motive advanced why immi-
grants hoard. This argument again rests on the U.S. experience. Jankowski
et al. (2007) show empirically for the Chicago area that Hispanics, in con-
trast to other immigrant groups, hoard USD 100 notes. The conjectured
motive advanced by the authors is that the Hispanics exhibit a low of ﬁ-
nancial participation. Frictions in banking services for Hispanic immigrants
in the United States include the lack of a common language, the lack of
9residence documentation, and the salary payment in cash or check.
The unbanked argument does not readily apply to immigrants in Switzer-
land. Independent of their skill-level or language skills, employees in Switzer-
land need a bank account to receive their salary. Almost all salary payments
in Switzerland are electronic transfers. The use of cash or checks as means
of payment for the monthly wage is unrepresentative of the formal sector in
Switzerland.
3. Econometric Speciﬁcation and Data
This section ﬁrst presents the empirical model together with the instrumenta-
tion strategy. Empirical estimates from the ﬁrst-stage regression are shown.
In a second subsection, the data are discussed.
3.1 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The econometric model estimates the demand eﬀect of immigrants to natives
of a Swiss city on currency orders in the same city. Currency orders are
volume measures in Swiss francs for six banknotes: CHF 10, CHF 20, CHF
50, CHF 100, CHF 200, and CHF 1000. The following speciﬁcation adapted
from Lach (2007) and Frattini (2008) deﬁnes the currency order, COjct, for
Swiss banknote j (j = 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, and 1000) in city c (c = 1, ···,
10250) for the quarterly sample from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4 for t is
logCOjct = µt + µc + δ(Ict/Nct) + βlog(Ict + Nct) + λXct + ujct, (1)
where Ict and Nct are the number of immigrants and natives in city, c, in
quarter t, µ0s are time and city eﬀects, Xct are additional city speciﬁc factors
(i.e., the unemployment rate as a proxy for economic activity), and ujct is a
shock to currency orders in quarter t. Total population in city, c, for quarter,
t, equals Ict + Nct.
The variable of interest in equation (1) is δ. An insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
estimate for I/N says that preferences for cash holdings between immigrants
and natives are similar. Alternatively, if δ is positive this says that Euro-
pean immigrants in Switzerland have strong preferences to hoard currency.
Similarly, the opposite holds, when δ is negative.
Irrespective where immigrants settle in Switzerland, currency orders are
demand driven. Thus, there is no endogeneity conundrum between supply
and demand. However, missing variables, such as prices or income unavail-
able at the city level, inﬂuence an immigrant’s decision to reside in a partic-
ular Swiss city and are certainly correlated with money orders. The omitted
variables problem biases the estimates of δ in (1). In the case of rising in-
come, this leads to an upward biased estimate of δ. I resolve this problem of
11omitted variables by instrumenting for Ict/Nct.
The instrument variable is based on settlement patterns of previous immi-
grants. Following Card (2001), I construct a variable that predicts immigrant
ﬂows in each city in each quarter. The intuition is to exploit the location
choices of past immigrants from each area of origin to predict the settlement
decisions of immigrants from the same country. The instrument variable
predicts immigrant inﬂows ﬁltering local contemporary demand factors.
In a ﬁrst step, immigrants are divided into 11 European countries of
origin. I then calculate Iit, the number of immigrants from each country, i,
that reside in Switzerland in quarter t.6 Next, the fraction of immigrants from
country, i, in city, c, is the quarterly average for the year 2005, ¯ λci = ¯ Ici/¯ Ii.
The predicted number of immigrants from country i in quarter t is ¯ λciIit. By
summing over i, a measure of the predicted total immigrant inﬂow into city
c at time t is obtained that is free of local shocks. A ﬁnal step normalizes







Table 2 presents the ﬁrst-stage regressions of the immigrant-to-native
6The countries of origin are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Serbia,
Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and others.
12ratio on the supply push instrument, SPct. The OLS regressions are from
2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4 with city eﬀects. In each regression, the instrument has
a t-value above 5, suggesting that SP passes the critic of weak instruments.
The ﬁrst regression in column 1 is unrestricted. It includes information on
immigrants from 2675 cities. Next in column 2, the sample is restricted to
243 cities receiving UBS cash orders for CHF 1000 notes in 2006 and 2007.
Column 3 shows the restricted ﬁrst-stage regression of column 2 with time
eﬀects. The last speciﬁcation in column 4, which is used in the analysis in
section 4, includes log(population) and the unemployed-to-population ratio
in the speciﬁcation of column (3).
3.2 The Data
The quarterly sample from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4 covers a maximum of 251
cities. Data on cash orders at the bank-branch level are aggregated to the
city level. The quarterly data are from UBS, the largest national distributor
of banknotes in Switzerland.7 UBS handles one-third of the total distribution
activity in Switzerland.
7The distribution of banknotes is fully privatized in Switzerland. Most distributors
operate only regionally. Information on the location of notes returned to the Swiss National
Bank is unavailable.
13Coverage of the currency orders is documented graphically together with
statical information. The geographical coverage of UBS’ distribution activ-
ities in Swiss cities is shown in ﬁgure 1. The sparse areas in ﬁgure 1 are
consistent with Switzerland’s mountain regions. Further statistical coverage
of the currency orders is given in Table 3. The ﬁrst column shows the num-
ber of cities served. They range between 199 and 251. Column 2 shows
the percentage of German speaking cities served. Apart from the CHF 50
note, the currency percentages lie close to the national average of 72% of
the German-speaking population. Next, columns 3 to 6 provide informa-
tion on the average, minimum and maximum, and standard deviation of the
quarterly total of the distributed currency. In the last column, the quarterly
average from column 3 is divided by the average quarterly outstanding cur-
rency for the respective banknote. Except for the CHF 10 and the CHF 200
banknote, the percentages lie between 10% and 15%. The low percentage
for the CHF 10 note (0.005%) suggests that UBS coverage is problematic,
whereas the distribution of CHF 200 note (46%) may be over-representive
with respect to the other notes.
The postal code from the currency orders allows us to match the currency
orders with various other sources. From the Federal Oﬃce for Migration, I
14obtained data on the number of foreigners by groups of their origin for each
commune in Switzerland. The data is available at the quarterly frequency.
Further, the number of unemployed workers for each commune is from the
State Secretariat for Economic Aﬀairs. The monthly data is averaged at the
quarterly level. In addition, I obtained data on the total resident population
and on spatial characteristics for each commune from the Federal Oﬃce of
Statistics. The population data, which is only available at annual frequency,
is disaggregated by a linear interpolation over a 20 year period from 1989 to
2008.
4. Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results. In a ﬁrst subsection, the main
result for large banknotes is documented: the correlation between currency
orders and the immigrant-to-native ratio is negative. In a second subsection,
I control for income eﬀects by excluding geographical areas where poorer
natives reside (i.e., mountainous and rural areas). These results show that
the hoarding eﬀect is linked to wealthier natives.
4.1 The Main Results
Table 4 presents OLS and IV regression estimates for CHF 200 and CHF
151000 banknote orders at the city and time level. All regressions are for
the full sample and control for city eﬀects. The coeﬃcient estimates for
the immigrant-to-native ratio are sensitive to estimation type and the in-
troduction of time eﬀects. The sequential introduction of population and
the number of unemployed do not inﬂuence the coeﬃcient estimates for the
immigrant-to-native ratio.
OLS estimates are presented in the top panel of Table 4. The immigrant-
to-native ratios are insigniﬁcant for all speciﬁcations of the CHF 200 ban-
knotes. The introduction of city size (log population), economic activity
(unemployed-to-population ratio), or time eﬀects does not change the re-
sult that the demand for 200 banknotes does not diﬀer between immigrants
and natives. A similar picture emerges for the OLS estimates for the CHF
1000 notes. The immigrant-to-native ratio is positive and signiﬁcant in the
regression without time eﬀects, see column 5. The introduction of time dum-
mies to control for aggregate trend eﬀects reduces the coeﬃcient estimate
of the immigrant-to-native ratio fourfold and eliminates its signiﬁcance, see
columns 7 and 8.
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows IV estimates of diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of equation (1). The F-tests from the ﬁrst-stage regression are all highly sig-
16niﬁcant, suggesting that the critic of weak instrument does not apply. The
coeﬃcient estimates for the immigrant-to-native ratio are negative and signif-
icant at the 1% critical level in the regression for the CHF 200 banknotes. The
coeﬃcient size for I/N jumps from -10 to -20 with the introduction of time
eﬀects. In other words, a one percent increase in the immigrant-to-native
ratio leads to a reduction by CHF 4000. This result is partially compensated
by population size by 1000 (i.e., it has a coeﬃcient size of 5). These results
are not sensitive to the introduction of the unemployed-to-population ratio.
It enters with a positive coeﬃcient and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
The IV estimates for CHF 1000 banknotes resemble those for CHF 200
banknotes. The coeﬃcient estimates for I/N fall from 7.7 to -7.7 with the in-
troduction of the time eﬀects, see columns 6 and 7. The coeﬃcient estimates
of I/N are negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the regressions with
time eﬀects, see column 7. The regressions with time eﬀects show that a one
percent increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio leads to a CHF 7000 reduc-
tion in the demand for large banknotes. Again, this result is compensated
by population size in the order of CHF 3000.
Next, I examine whether the disproportionate eﬀect between immigrants
and natives for large banknotes holds for other banknote denominations. A
17signiﬁcant negative result across all banknote denominations is consistent
with the view that the immigrant-to-native ratio is capturing demographic
traits linked to immigrants (i.e., income or age). The IV regressions in Table
5 are based on speciﬁcations (4) and (8) from Table 4. Only the coeﬃcient
estimates for the immigrant-to-native ratio are shown. The results show that
the immigrant demand for smaller banknotes is not distinct from natives,
except for the CHF 20 notes. The coeﬃcient estimates are insigniﬁcant for
the CHF 10, CHF 50, and the CHF 100 banknote, whereas for the CHF 20
note it is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. I interpret these results as
further evidence of hoarding on the part of natives.
A further consideration is whether the hoarding of large CHF banknotes
is identiﬁed with a particular immigrant group. The four largest immi-
grant groups in Switzerland are Germans, Italians, Serbians, and Portuguese.
These four immigrants groups have diﬀerent levels of education. German im-
migrants have the highest percentage of university degrees (64% in 2007, see
Table 1) and the Portuguese the lowest (6% in 2007). The IV regressions in
Table 6 again show only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio for
the full speciﬁcation of equation (1). The instruments have been adjusted so
that only the ﬁxed immigrant share at the city level in 2005 is multiplied by
18the aggregate of the respective immigrant group. The IV regressions show
that the coeﬃcients are negative except for Serbian immigrants in the de-
mand speciﬁcation for CHF 1000 notes. The negative and signiﬁcant results
for the more educated immigrants (i.e., Germans and Italians) however is
not consistent with evidence from micro studies that ﬁnd education to be
positively correlated with money.
4.2 Controlling for City and Regional Characteristics
As robustness checks, I control for income and non linear eﬀects based on
sample splits for city and geographic characteristics. The evidence reveals
that these factors are non neutral, however the main result that natives hoard
more than immigrants holds.
Table 7 presents coeﬃcient estimates for I/N in regressions with CHF
200 and CHF 1000 banknotes that control for city characteristics. Panel A
divides the sample based on a city population below or above 10000 residents.
The results show stronger evidence of hoarding on the part of natives for CHF
200 notes in smaller cities. The opposite result holds for the largest banknote.
The immigrant-to-native ratio is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level for
large cities. This hoarding result is consistent with the fact that incomes are
higher in larger cities.
19Next in panel B, the sample is split around the unemployment-to-population
ratio of 0.01 (i.e., the sample average). For both banknotes, the hoarding
eﬀect is strongest in cities with a higher unemployment rate. In the sample of
cities with low unemployment, the demand for large denominated banknotes
between natives and immigrants is indistinguishable.
The role of special tax reductions is examined in panel C of table 7.
The sample is divided between cities that are exempt from speacial taxes
because of their weak ﬁnancial position. The coeﬃcient estimates for I/N
show that cities not beneﬁtting from the tax reduction, hoarding prevails.
The coeﬃcient estimates are close to the full sample estimates recorded in
table 4, but their level of signiﬁcance is higher. The insigniﬁcant estimates
for the sample of cities enjoying tax beneﬁts however must be interpreted
with care. The sample size is small and the F-test values from the ﬁrst-stage
regressions are low.
Table 8 considers the inﬂuence of geographic location on the distribution
of CHF 200 and CHF 1000 banknote orders. The sample is split at the city
level in three ways: border versus non border cantons, rural versus urban ar-
eas, and mountain versus low-land regions. The sample splits are motivated
by location of commercial activity: cross border transactions (border can-
20tons), agriculture sector (rural), and tourism (mountain region). The border
cantons are marked by a greater degree of openness, whereas the agriculture
(8.1% immigrant labor participation in 2006) and tourist (51%) sector con-
trol for income eﬀects and contrasting immigrant participation rates in the
labor force.
Panel A shows IV estimates for samples deﬁned as border and non border
cantons. For the CHF 200 notes, the demand by immigrants living in the
central region of Switzerland is signiﬁcant and the point estimate of -19 is
consistent with the full sample results for Switzerland shown in Table 4.
The immigrant eﬀect of border cantons is -8 and insigniﬁcant. For the CHF
1000, the coeﬃcient values are similar to the unrestricted sample of table 4,
but they are insigniﬁcant. The evidence suggests that Swiss residing in the
central area (non border cantons) hoard more than immigrants living in the
same area.
Panel B shows the results for rural and non rural areas. This sample split
controls for higher-income eﬀects and higher labor participation eﬀects on
the part of immigrants in non rural areas. Only for the non rural areas is
a negative and signiﬁcant result obtained. Again, the results reconﬁrm the
conjecture that wealthier Swiss are driving the demand for large banknotes.
21The result for the rural areas has to be interpreted with caution because of
the low F-test values from the ﬁrst-stage regressions.
Panel C divides the sample based on elevation. Only for the low lands
is a negative and signiﬁcant result for I/N obtained. The estimates for the
immigrant-to-native ratio are insigniﬁcant for cities in the mountain areas.
The insigniﬁcance result can be explained by the fact that the incomes of
cities in the mountain areas lie well below the national averages. This is
consistent with the view that poorer residents are not inﬂuenced by wealth
taxes.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the impact of European immigration
on money demand in Switzerland. Despite a diverse literature studying de-
mographic eﬀects on money demand, this is the ﬁrst study to examine the
impact of immigration on banknote circulation. Immigrants in Switzerland
are younger and less wealthier than natives. I use the immigrant population
as a control group to examine the role of hoarding for large banknotes.
The empirical results show that immigrant cities have a lower demand for
the largest Swiss banknotes. Controlling for population size, a one percent
22increase in the native-to-population ratio reduced the demand for the CHF
1000 note by CHF 4000. The eﬀect for the CHF 200 note is found to be
similar, while for most of the smaller denominated notes no immigrant eﬀect
was found. These pronounced eﬀects are too large to be explained by simple
demographic traits. Rather I interpret these the negative immigrant eﬀect
to be evidence of hoarding linked to tax avoidance on the part of natives.
This hoarding behavior is strongest in the wealthier regions of Switzerland.
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Table 1: Education of Swiss and Immigrants (thousands)
2006 2007 2006 2007
High School Certificate  680 675 0.168 0.164
Swiss 410 408 0.128 0.128
Immigrants 270 267 0.318 0.305
Germany 3 3 0.031 0.023
France 3 4 0.067 0.082
Italy 54 52 0.332 0.318
Spain and Greece 18 15 0.337 0.309
Portugal 70 73 0.676 0.661
Serbia 71 70 0.445 0.431
Appenticeship 2198 2204 0.543 0.535
Swiss 1852 1850 0.579 0.570
Immigrants 346 354 0.407 0.404
Germany 36 38 0.348 0.333
France 16 16 0.381 0.357
Italy 83 84 0.510 0.518
Spain and Greece 25 23 0.479 0.467
Portugal 28 31 0.273 0.281
Serbia 79 82 0.494 0.507
University Degree 1173 1243 0.290 0.302
Swiss 939 988 0.293 0.304
Immigrants 234 255 0.275 0.291
Germany 64 74 0.622 0.644
France 23 25 0.553 0.561
Italy 26 26 0.158 0.163
Spain and Greece 10 11 0.184 0.224
Portugal 5 6 0.051 0.058
Serbia 10 10 0.060 0.062
Total 4051 4122 1.000 1.000
Swiss 3201 3246 1.000 1.000
Immigrants 850 876 1.000 1.000
Germany 103 115 1.000 1.000
France 43 45 1.000 1.000
Italy 163 162 1.000 1.000
Spain and Greece 52 50 1.000 1.000
Portugal 103 110 1.000 1.000
Serbia 159 161 1.000 1.000
Notes: source Swiss Federal Statistics Office. Sake Survey  
28Table 2: Immigrant-to-Native Ratio and the Instrument SP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
restricted restricted restricted
unrestricted CHF 1000 only  CHF 1000 only  CHF 1000 only 
OLS Estimation     
SP 1.690*** 1.730*** 1.931*** 2.028***
(0.310) (0.1760) (0.424) (0.400)
ln population no no no yes
unemployment/population no no no yes
time effects no no yes yes
 
Number of observations 20414 1859 1859 1859
Number of cities 2675 243 243 243
Notes: Estimation is OLS with fixed (city) effects. SP is the instrument. Sample is from 2006:Q1 to
 2007:Q4.  *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets.  
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Table 3: Statistics on UBS Currency Orders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  German speaking average ave cur. order.to
total cities cities  only  per quarter min max St. Dev.  ave outstanding
CHF 10 199 0.754 3.0 2.3 3.8 0.6 0.005
CHF 20 249 0.715 194 169 213 14.7 0.148
CHF 50 173 0.867 188 150 229 26.7 0.106
CHF 100 242 0.736 948 835 1280 149.0 0.125
CHF 200 251 0.708 2760 2560 3110 178.0 0.461
CHF 1000 244 0.713 2220 1870 2840 392.0 0.102
Notes: Total cities are number of cities covered by UBS currency orders. German speaking cities is the percentage of German speaking 
cities to total cities served by UBS. Ave. per quarter denotes the average currency volume for a particular banknote in millions. 
min and max are with respect to the quarterly volume from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. st. dev. is the standard deviation in millions.
ave cur order to ave outstanding is the average quarterly volume of currency orders to the quarterly average of notes in circulation.  
30Table 4: Immigrant-to-Native Ratio and large Banknotes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CHF banknotes 200 200 200 200 1000 1000 1000 1000
OLS Estimation        
Immigrant/Natives -0.042 0.500 -0.421 -0.472 3.523*** 2.727*** 0.753 0.725
(0.950) (0.983) (0.909) (0.910) (0.213) (0.791) (0.622) (0.603)
ln population -2.099*** -0.321 -0.281 3.058** 0.473 0.495
(0.784) (0.800) (0.802) (1.077) (1.048) (1.046)
unemployment/population  4.839* 3.382
 (2.584) (2.366)
time effects no no yes yes no no yes yes
Number of observations 1911 1911 1911 1911 1859 1859 1859 1859
Number of cities 249 249 249 249 243 243 243 243
R-square 0.940 0.942 0.945 0.945 0.930 0.930 0.954 0.961
IV Estimation
Immigrant/Natives -9.790*** -10.845** -21.047*** -20.586*** 9.206*** 7.741** -7.703* -7.416*
(3.412) (4.411) (6.313) (6.241) (2.928) (3.746) (4.129) (4.091)
 
ln population 1.188 5.192** 5.106** 1.651 2.753* 2.693*
(1.716) (2.202) (2.185) (1.465) (4.129) (1.464)
unemployment/population  6.586** 3.913*
 (3.315) (2.314)
time effects no no yes yes no no yes yes
 
Number of observations 1911 1911 1911 1911 1859 1859 1859 1859
Number of cities 249 249 249 249 243 243 243 243
R-square 0.130 0.001 0.061 0.063 0.175 0.286 0.115 0.120
  
F-test (first stage regression) 184.3 129.95 34.24 31.10 181.04 127.83 33.81 30.65
Notes: Estimation is OLS or IV with fixed (city) effects. Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
 *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets.  
31Table 5: Immigrant-to-Native Ratio on Currency Orders of Different Denomination
CHF banknotes 10 20 50 100 200 1000
Immigrant/Natives -11.465 -21.938** 7.476 -11.936 -20.568*** -7.416*
(14.095) (8.715) (11.831) (7.753) (6.241) (4.091)
Number of observations 896 1764 1497 1884 1991 1859
Number of cities 198 248 241 250 249 243
R-square 0.158 0.056 0.126 0.110 0.063 0.120
F-test (first stage regression) 21.64 29.25 23.01 31.24 31.10 30.65
Notes:Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets.  
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Table 6:   Ethnic cities and large currency orders
CHF 200 banknote        
Immigrant group Germans Italians Serbians Portuguese
Immigrant/Natives -19.277*** -69.889 -593.963 -8.516
(5.592) (63.580) (848.131) (22.308)
Number of observations 1911 1911 1911 1911
Number of cities 249 249 249 249
R-square 0.197 0.130 0.018 0.108
F-test (first stage regression) 224.79 27.31 20.84 23.06
CHF 1000 banknote        
immigrant group Germans Italians Serbians Portuguese
Immigrant/Natives -0.864 -80.994* 1.020 -6.368
(3.944) (47.887) (161.464) (15.985)
Number of observations 1859 1859 1859 1859
Number of cities 243 243 243 243
R-square 0.247 0.119 0.245 0.192
F-test (first stage regression) 223.33 27.10 20.84 22.94
Notes:Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets.  
33Table 7: City Characteristics, Immigrant-to-Native Ratio, and Cash Orders
CHF Banknotes 200 200 1000 1000
A: City population < 10000 yes no yes no
Immigrant/Natives -22.799** -11.592 -5.454 -9.052*
(8.965) (8.375) (6.459) (4.796)
Number of observations 1096 815 1060 799
Number of cities 143 107 139 105
R-square 0.018 0.104 0.000 0.045
F-test (first stage regression) 15.79 20.10 15.21 20.91
B. Unemployed/population < 0.01 yes no yes no
Immigrant/Natives -9.997 -17.775** 14.678 -8.797*
(13.861) (7.277) (11.632) (4.853)
Number of observations 527 1384 507 1352
Number of cities 118 228 115 223
R-square 0.006 0.104 0.017 0.096
F-test (first stage regression) 10.28 25.13 10.37 24.78
C. Special Tax Treatment yes no yes no
Immigrant/Natives -132.339 -18.146*** 91.544 -10.533***
(363.628) (6.302) (126.117) (3.970)
Number of observations 343 1569 333 1526
Number of cities 43 206 42 201
R-square 0.130 0.070 0.100 0.102
F-test (first stage regression) 1.50 30.94 1.34 30.44
Notes:Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets.  
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Table 8: Geographical Characteristics, Immigrant-to-Native Ratio, and Cash Orders
CHF Banknotes 200 200 1000 1000
A:  Border Canton  yes no yes no
Immigrant/Native -8.192 -19.144*** 6.383 -6.676
(16.422) (7.472) (14.308) (4.637)
Number of observations 538 1373 504 1355
Number of cities 68 181 64 179
R-square 0.050 0.005 0.070 0.002
F-test (first stage regression) 19.61 21.77 19.73 21.37
      
B: Rural area yes no yes no
Immigrant/Native -63.301 -15.416** 12.297 -10.075***
(68.018) (6.239) (20.009) (3.881)
Number of observations 608 1303 595 1264
Number of cities 79 170 77 166
R-square 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.064
F-test (first stage regression) 7.64 30.04 7.50 29.13
C: Alp - mountain area yes no yes no
Immigrant/Native -10.658 -20.098*** 4.961 -11.760**
(7.338) (7.814) (6.638) (4.762)
Number of observations 762 1149 760 1099
Number of cities 98 151 98 145
R-square 0.039 0.149 0.045 0.191
F-test (first stage regression) 18.46 20.09 18.57 19.85
Notes:Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets.  
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